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Protecting Arctic Ocean Marine Biodiversity
in the Area Beyond National Jurisdiction
Plausible Legal Frameworks for Protecting High Arctic
Waters
Kamrul Hossain and Kathleen Morris
1 Introduction
An estimated 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of the world’s
undiscovered oil lies in the Arctic, most of it offshore.1 Once impossible shipping
routes—such as the Northern Sea Route and even a possible transarctic route—
appear increasingly feasible due to sea ice melt.2 Arctic shipping traffic as a whole
is anticipated to increase in coming years due to ice melt allowing for longer
shipping seasons (see footnote 2). Past sea ice melt indicates that the Arctic may
be ice-free within decades, opening waters—and resources—previously sheltered
by ice from mankind’s exploits.3 Once protected by ice, the vast northern landscape
compares in size to Africa and exists as one of Earth’s final pristine ecosystems.4
Further, its wealth of resources includes more than oil, with living resources that
include 5000 animal species; 2000 types of algae; and tens of thousands of
ecologically critical microbes.5
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Present economic opportunity in the Arctic is only possible through a funda-
mental challenge to Arctic biodiversity: rapid climate change brought on by global
warming.6 The year 2015 proved to be the warmest year on record.7 Global-
warming-caused sea ice melt will not only pressure the Arctic marine ecosystem
but also allow for anthropogenic activity and disturbances in previously
unreachable parts of the Arctic Ocean. Opening waters promise to enable height-
ened resource extraction, tourism, shipping and navigation, and fishing activity.
Arctic and non-Arctic states alike now express competitive economic stakes in the
region in what has been termed the next “Great Game.”8 Thus, dual pressure of
climate change and anthropogenic activity may threaten the living resources unique
to the Arctic. Considering these economic and geopolitical shifts, it is worthwhile to
consider whether current international law, such as the Law of the Sea, is sufficient
to govern a changing region and protect its marine environment.
In anticipation of broader economic activity and environmental threat in the
region—brought on by sea ice melt and the emergence of other states as stake-
holders—the five Arctic coastal states reaffirmed a commitment to the Law of the
Sea, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS),
in the Ilulissat Declaration of March 2008.9 Prior to the Declaration, discourse over
Arctic governance began to consider the need for a new international treaty to
govern the region. Media, academia, and Arctic strategies of non-Arctic states
expressed growing concern that the Law of the Sea, given its rudimentary frame-
work, was not sufficient to govern the Arctic ecosystem in changing environmental
and commercial contexts. The following text will consider: is a new international
legal instrument necessary for the protection of the Arctic marine environment? We
suggest that existing legal instruments, such as the UNCLOS, suffice to govern the
region and enable more comprehensive environmental preservation, particularly in
the form of marine protected areas (MPAs).
Our analysis examines current state-led efforts to designating large portions of
the Arctic as “marine protected areas” (MPAs), which would limit human activity
in protected waters in an effort to preserve marine biodiversity conforming to the
approach known as ecosystem-based management (EBM). The principle of EBM
emphasizes environmental cross-linkages that require collaborative ecosystem
management transcending national jurisdictions and boundaries.10 In contrast,
current discourse around resource exploitation of the region describes a likelihood
of geopolitical “scramble for the Arctic,” drawing parallels to European imperial
6Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) (2005), pp. 247, 1017.
7Hottest year on record according to surface temperature data from GISS Surface Temperature
Analysis (GISTEMP) See GISTEMP Team (2016).
8Borgerson (2009).
9The Ilulissat Declaration provides the clear and firm statement that there is no need to develop a
new arrangement for Arctic governance. See Arctic Ocean Conference,May 27–29, 2008, Ilulissat
Declaration (May 28, 2008).
10UNEP/GPA (2006), p. 4.
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competition over African resources.11 In this scramble, state interests, including
prospects for control over shipping lanes, oil resources, and fishing rights, depend
on the lineation of exclusive economic zone boundaries based on seabed claims.
Thus, while transboundary environmental protection is critical, the current Law of
the Sea system emphasizes the importance of said boundaries, for delineating
states’ rights to respective coastal waters and resources. As such, the growing
need for Arctic MPA creation in areas beyond national jurisdiction poses a chal-
lenge to the contemporary limitations of Law of the Sea.
Moreover, a considerable portion of the Arctic Ocean—2.8 million square
kilometers—lies in an area beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), thus falling
beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of any state actor.12 Currently, global
ocean management is hindered by the lack of a clear mechanism for MPA desig-
nation in ABNJs. Recent leadership by the Arctic Council established the goal of
creating a pan-Arctic network of MPAs through piece-by-piece coordination of
nation-led efforts to create MPAs within sovereign borders.13 As such, the High
Arctic cannot be designated as part of the network due to its status in ABNJ. Thus,
in the following chapter drawing from our article “Legal Instruments for Marine
Sanctuary in the High Arctic,” we examine the limitations of MPA creation in the
high seas under the contemporary Law of the Seas.14 Our analysis will consider the
ongoing process at the UN level to draft an internationally binding legal instrument
on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in the areas
beyond national jurisdiction under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.15 We,
however, also consider various legal mechanisms that provide a mandate for MPA
creation even in ABNJ that could allow for a plausible management regime to
protect marine biodiversity.
No set universal legal mechanism is currently recognized to enable MPA
creation in the High Arctic with acknowledgement of the UNCLOS. So we evaluate
potential legal justification for the creation of an MPA in the High Arctic ABNJ, by
way of precedent of mandates such as the UNCLOS and UN Convention on
Biodiversity (UNCBD). We conclude that while the UNCLOS and UNCBD do
offer a legal mandate for High Arctic MPA creation, a regional multilateral
agreement offers the best solution for High Arctic MPA creation in the next
decades.
11Grindheim (2009), p. 1.
12The Pew Charitable Trusts.
13PAME International Secretariat (April 2015), pp. 1–76.
14Morris and Hossain (2016).
15UN GA Res. 69/292 of 19 June 2015.
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2 The Arctic Ocean: A Critical Intersection of Competing
and Common Interests
According to the preamble of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (CBD), there is an “intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the ecological,
genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aes-
thetic values of biological diversity and its components.”16 Beyond this inherent
value of Arctic biodiversity, human enjoyment and cultural valuation add another
layer of importance to the Arctic environment. The economic value of marine
biodiversity lies in its ecosystem services, such as ability to provide food, genetic
resources, climate regulation through carbon sequestration, and a basis for local
jobs.17 Specific to the Arctic, critical industries such as environmental tourism
depend on ecosystem health and preservation of biodiversity. Biodiversity is also
critical to emerging medical science: biotechnology innovation depends on the
genetic variability of marine species, with diverse physiological and biochemical
properties resulting from evolution in extreme cold Arctic waters.18 The benefits of
Arctic biodiversity are felt globally, as they affect species adaptation to climate
change, the global economy, future medical science, and overall species diversity
on Earth.
Presently, as a result of the increase in the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere,
which accelerates melting of Arctic sea ice, Arctic biodiversity finds itself under the
assault of anthropogenic climate change and ocean acidification. The Arctic Marine
Shipping Assessment Report of 2009 concludes that sea ice melt will allow for ship
navigation and resource extraction in areas previously covered by ice.19 Tourism,
shipping, oil and gas exploitation, fishing, and other industry-related maritime
activity might therefore increase in the Arctic.20 Thus, dual pressures—climate
change and increased human activities—will stress the Arctic marine environment
with dire implications for its unique biodiversity.
As the Arctic Ocean opens up to oil and gas extraction, countries have an
economic interest in claiming sovereignty over the continental shelves underneath
the Arctic Ocean. By virtue of Article 76 of the UNCLOS, such claim could extend
to unlimited area of the ocean floor beyond 200 nautical miles, where the surface
and subsurface waters above are still high seas subject to global commons (see
Article 76).21 As of August 2015, four out of five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean
(the United States being the exception) had filed their submissions to extend the
limits of their continental shelves into the Arctic Ocean.22 Russia was the first
16United Nations, “Convention on Biological Diversity” (1992), p. 1.
17Fauria and Kettunen (2015). TEEB Report for the Arctic, pp. 32, 34, 36.
18Kattunen (2015), p. 11.
19Arctic Council. Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, p. 4.
20Young (2010), pp. 165–166.
21United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 76.
22Submissions To The CLCS (2015).
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country to lodge its submission in 2001, claiming almost half of the Arctic Ocean
seabed as its extended continental shelf.23 In response to the request from the
Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS) for resubmission with
further data, Russia renewed its claims recently in 2015, claiming an even greater
portion of seabed (see footnote 23). Norway submitted its claim in 2006 and
received a final recommendation from the Commission on the Limits of Continental
Shelf in 2009, whereas both Canada (partially) and Denmark submitted their claims
in 2013 and 2014, respectively.24 The United States is not yet a party to UNCLOS
and is thus not yet able to lodge any formal submission to the CLCS. However, it is
worth noting that most extractable resources fall within undisputed areas, within the
Arctic littoral states’ EEZs.
2.1 The Ilulissat Declaration: Reaffirming the Law of the Sea
and Arctic Council Amid New Challenges
While competing claims may appear to signal competing interests in the region,
regional actions have largely been evidenced as cooperative. At the March 2008
Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland, the five Arctic coastal states
(Canada, Denmark, Russia, the United States of America, and Norway) convened
and signed the resulting Ilulissat Declaration, which reaffirmed the commitment to
the Law of the Seas and to an “orderly settlement of any possible overlapping
claims.”25 The Ilulissat Declaration concluded that the Law of the Sea contained
necessary provisions for responsible ecosystem management on the part of the five
Arctic coastal states. Thus, the five Arctic coastal states reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the existing legal framework for governance of the Arctic Ocean, under
Law of the Sea. The Declaration also calls for heightened cooperation with the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to strengthen regulations to prevent
pollution and accidents resulting from heightened ship traffic from shipping, tour-
ism, resource development, and research vessels (see footnote 25). Despite
appearing as an assertion of coastal state predominance in the region, the document
reaffirms the five Arctic states’ commitment to the Arctic Council, established in
1996, and other related forums (see footnote 25).
23Proelss and Müller (2008), pp. 651, 665–677.
24UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).
25Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat Declaration (May 28, 2008).
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2.2 Changing Tides: The Inclusion of Non-Arctic States
as Arctic Council Observers
The largest challenge to the existing legal framework will instead likely come from
states with no existing littoral rights in the region. The volume of applications for
observer status in the Arctic Council increased notably in recent years.26
Non-Arctic states increasingly perceive national interest in the region due to
economic prospects made available by an opening Arctic. In particular, East
Asian states such as Japan and China see potential commercial gains expanding
fishing areas and faster shipping routes enabling trade.27 Though previously lacking
political status in the region, Asian influence has grown in the Arctic region by the
way of gaining observer status on the Arctic Council. In 2013, China, India, Japan,
Singapore, and South Korea all were granted observer status on the Arctic Council,
along with Italy.28 Though observers are void of decision-making power, the
observer status allows for non-Arctic states to influence indirectly by way of
being involved on participation in working groups, financial contributions, project
proposals, and verbal and written statements.29 China’s Arctic strategy, as articu-
lated by Chinese officials, cautiously reframes Arctic governance as being an
international issue warranting recognition of non-Arctic states’ interests due to
common resources and shipping routes.30 As noted by Jakobson (2010), the former
Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu Zhengyue said:
When determining the delimitation of outer continental shelves, the Arctic states need to
not only properly handle relationships among themselves, but must also consider the
relationship between the outer continental shelf and the international submarine area that
is the common human heritage, to ensure a balance of coastal countries’ interests and the
common interests of the international community.31
Increased non-Arctic state involvement in the region may therefore challenge
existing legal frameworks governing the high sea water column and complicate
regional agreements in the Arctic. As previously mentioned, this contrasts with the
Arctic 5 coastal states’ bypass of the Arctic Council in favor of releasing the 2008
Ilulissat Declaration to reaffirm their commitment to using UNCLOS to settle any
legal challenges in the Arctic, and suggesting the primacy of coastal states in the
area. Amid growing interest of both observer states and coastal states, Oran Young
26The 2013 Kiruna Declaration welcomed China, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea and
Singapore as new Observer States. See Arctic Council Secretariat. Kiruna Declaration (2013).
27Jakobson (2010), p. 13.
28Arctic Council Secretariat. Kiruna Declaration (2013).
29Note that observer states’ financial contributions cannot exceed those of Arctic States, except as
directed by Senior Arctic Officials. See Arctic Council. Arctic Council Observer Manual for
Subsidiary Bodies (2014).
30Jakobson (2010), pp. 9–10, 13.
31Jakobson (2010), p. 10.
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(2010) suggests that the Arctic Council finds itself at a point of “state change” in
which its existing governance structure is challenged.32
While international actors might acknowledge the High Arctic marine environ-
ment (in the international water column) as a common resource, notions of how the
common resource should be used can be expected to differ greatly. States that stand
to gain economically from fishing rights and navigational routes have the potential
to conflict with state and non-state actors on their visions for the conservation of the
Arctic Ocean. Further, a growing body of influential observer states have eventually
outnumbered the Arctic states themselves. Admittedly, the observers’mandate does
not hold a significant role in decision making in the Arctic Council. The Arctic
Eight may, however, find their individual interests in the Arctic complicated by a
growing number of actors exerting pressure by way of expertise, written opinions,
and funding power. At the 2011 Nuuk Ministerial Meeting, one Russian diplomat
voiced the concern that a growing majority of observers might demand more rights,
perhaps to the extent of designating the Arctic as “universal humankind heritage”
on the model of the Antarctic.33 Thus, while present discourse often depicts
non-Arctic observers as potential resource exploiters and obstacles to preservation,
the growing influence of non-Arctic states in the region (particularly as Arctic
Council observers) has the normative power to reframe the Arctic as a global
commons of sorts mandating sweeping, collaborative protections. Thus, any
observer state pressure to designate the Arctic as “universal humankind heritage”
in need of a new legal regime would fundamentally challenge the status quo
adherence to Law of the Seas for Arctic Ocean governance.
2.3 Heightened Industry-Caused Pressure on Marine Species
Market prices and technological barriers will likely temper any “rush for the
Arctic,” particularly in the case of oil.34 Rather, short-term maritime activity is
anticipated to consist primarily of destination shipping.35 However, though poten-
tial grand-scale economic activity may be overstated, a lengthening navigational
season (enabled by sea ice melt) in summer and spring creates greater potential for
conflict between vessels and marine life.
Current late spring and summer month shipping generally takes place after
marine mammals migrate through narrow choke points, such as the Bering Strait.36
However, a lengthening shipping season risks more collisions between mammals
and vessels during times of migration and reproduction in early spring months.
32Young (2010), p. 168.
33Graczyk and Koivurova (2012), p. 5.
34Anderson (2009), pp. 198, 207–215.
35Lawson (2010).
36Arctic Council AMSA Report (2009), pp. 135–136.
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White Sea harp seals already undergo considerable pup mortality caused by colli-
sions with marine traffic, as vessels often breach the ice in seal whelping group-
ings.37 As shipping becomes possible earlier in the spring, there is increased risk of
ship-caused disruptions along sections of water that are key to migration patterns
and life cycles, such as feeding and nursery areas. Thus, heightened and highly
adaptive conservation efforts will be particularly important in protecting marine
mammal life cycles and migration patterns in coming years.
Migration patterns will also change, complicating the issue of protecting areas
critical to marine life stages. Fish stocks are particularly sensitive to temperature
and are predicted to continue to move toward the northern pole in search of cooler
waters.38 Sea-ice-dependent species in particular, such as polar bears and aquatic
mammals, also continue to move pole-ward in the search of remaining sea ice. As
sea ice continues to melt and species migration patterns and distributions shift
northward, biologically significant populations will increasingly be found in the
High Arctic. As the High Arctic also becomes vulnerable due to sea ice melt,
species in an area beyond national jurisdiction will lie vulnerable, without the
possibility of state-created marine protected areas to guard populations from ship
traffic.
Other risks associated with heightened ship traffic and resource development
include the introduction of non-native species, pollution, vessel collisions with
marine life, noise pollution, and other disruptions to the Arctic marine ecosystem.39
Not only are disruptions more likely as sea ice melts and northern routes are opened
to ships, but these disruptions are increasingly likely to occur in waters that are
beyond national jurisdiction and currently cannot be protected by a single state.
3 Need for Arctic Marine Protected Areas
In response to worldwide human-induced environmental damage, the UN CBD
identifies designation of protected areas as an important strategy for biodiversity
conservation. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature/World Com-
mission on Protected Areas (IUCN/WCPA) defines a protected area as:
clearly defined geographical space recognized, dedicated, and managed, through legal or
other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated
ecosystem services and cultural values.40
The CBD’s Aichi Target 11 established the goal of designating at least 10% of
marine and coastal areas as protected areas by 2020.41 Only a few years away from
37Vorontsova et al. (2008), pp. 586–592.
38Michel et al. (2009), pp. 487–518.
39Arctic Council AMSA Report (2009), p. 5.
40Dudley (2008), p. 8.
41Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010).
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this deadline, merely 1.55% of Arctic marine and coastal waters were protected,
OSPAR marine protected areas.42 Arctic terrestrial habitats are well protected by
comparison, with 17% considered protected by the year 2000.43
Though an enormous gap exists between terrestrial and marine protections, the
Arctic Council did identify the creation of a pan-Arctic marine protected area
(MPA) network as being a primary goal for the region in 2015. However, industrial
activities in Arctic waters and coastal areas are increasing, while MPA creation still
crawls behind. According to the Beaufort Sea Partnership (2009), MPA creation
can take approximately 10 years.44 Meanwhile, according to Wang and Overland’s
projections using 2007/2008 sea ice extant data, the Arctic is predicted to be nearly
sea ice-free by 2037.45 Under current legal infrastructure for MPA creation, glacial
melt may outpace the creation of any comprehensive High Arctic marine reserve.
Terrestrial conservation is generally aided by clear jurisdiction, whereas the
jurisdictional nature of the seas is much more complicated. Marine living resources
move from one jurisdiction to another, including in the high seas. This contrasts
with land-based protection, in which accepted borders generally allow for clear-cut,
nation-led conservation efforts. Of course, the UNCLOS does allow for national
claims to some waters as it designates areas within 200 nautical miles as being
within respective countries’ jurisdictions (in their exclusive economic zones or
EEZs). Even so, a considerable portion of the Arctic Ocean—1.1 million square
miles of ocean—falls beyond any country’s exclusive economic zone.46 Whereas
the marine areas within national jurisdiction (falling within EEZ) can be protected
by national regulations, as well as by regional agreements among coastal states, the
high sea—an area beyond national jurisdiction—instead remains open to all states
for free maritime use, following the general limits set by the UN Law of the Sea
Convention.
No single state or governing body has sovereignty over the Arctic high seas, an
ABNJ. So the discrepancy between terrestrial and marine reserve creation is further
perpetuated by a perceived lack of any accepted legal instrument for multilateral
protection efforts in the high seas. The UNCLOS protects states’ sovereign rights in
respective territorial waters, as well as rights to authority over the EEZ. The
Convention, however, offers only rudimentary provisions in regard to high sea
usage without having any concrete and adequate protection regime for the marine
species occurring in the Arctic.
In lieu of a presently accepted legal framework for marine protected area
creation in the ABNJ, the Arctic region presently adheres to a nation-led approach
under the leadership of the Arctic Council and its working groups. This strategy
42OSPAR Commission (2013), p. 29; OSPAR Commission (2009), pp. 7–8.
43CAFF (2002), p. 4.
44Beaufort Sea Partnership (2009).
45Wang and Overland (2012), pp. 4–5.
46The Pew Charitable Trusts: Arctic Ocean International.
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notably restricts marine protections to areas already under national jurisdiction, in
the exclusive economic zones of Arctic coastal states. As such, the Arctic high sea
is left vulnerable. Warming waters will lead more species—and more ships—north
while putting pressure on the existing ecosystem. Thus, we consider: what are the
constraints and limits of the current initiative to build a pan-Arctic network of
MPAs within EEZs? And if such an initiative cannot legally protect the Arctic high
seas, what other legal pathways exist?
Specifically considering the challenge of protecting marine life in the High
Arctic ABNJ, we will turn to examine potential legal mechanisms for MPA creation
in Arctic areas beyond national jurisdiction: creation of an Antarctic-modeled
Arctic sanctuary (see Sect. 5), an UNCLOS implementing agreement, an additional
protocol to the UNCBD, and an Arctic specific regional agreement (see Sects. 6.1,
6.2, and 6.3, respectively). Our evaluation of both the limits and merits of the
potential legal pathways leads us to suggest that a regional legal regime for MPA
creation in the High Arctic offers the most politically feasible and expedient
pathway to protection. This sort of legal regime, though limited in its capacity so
long as non-Arctic states are not parties, would still hold normative power and set a
critical precedent for the international community to recognize the importance of
protecting the High Arctic’s wealth of biodiversity.
However, we first turn to examine the existing pathway for protection: the state-
led network coordinated by the Arctic Council.
4 The Arctic Council’s State-Led Pathway for MPA
Creation
Presently, under the UNCLOS, actors are constrained in their ability to create
marine protected areas, particularly in the ABNJs, because MPAs cannot be
established unilaterally in these areas.47 Rather, human activity in areas that fall
outside of national jurisdiction instead can only be governed by international
arrangements, to some extent within the framework established by the IMO (see
footnote 46).
Current action for MPA creation in the Arctic follows a nation-led approach, in
which state actors designate MPAs within their particular EEZs. In 2015, the Arctic
Council articulated a commitment to the coordinated creation of marine protected
areas with its publication of the PAME Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of
Marine Protected Areas.
So what is the Arctic Council’s vision for this pan-Arctic network? The 2015
PAME Framework envisions the following:
An ecologically representative and well-connected collection of individual marine
protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures in the Arctic that
operate cooperatively, at various spatial scales, and with a range of protection levels, in
47United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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order to achieve the long-term conservation of the marine environment with associated
ecosystem services and cultural values more effectively and comprehensively than indi-
vidual sites could alone.48
The report plainly states that the network is not intended to be legally binding
(see footnote 49). So while regional cooperation on the pan-Arctic MPA network
will establish reciprocity for compliance among the Arctic states, it will be limited
in enforcement capability for Arctic and non-Arctic states alike. PAME describes
the Framework as offering guidance, which the Arctic states can each use to
designate their own MPAs according to their respective timelines, goals, and
authorities (see footnote 49). Individual state’s goals and domestic processes will
therefore affect the effectiveness of creating a pan-Arctic MPA network. The
PAME Framework states that differing prioritization of MPA creation among the
Arctic coastal states—not to mention their ruling parties and publics’ opinions—
will be a challenge.
Further, while the Framework acknowledges that “linkeages” exist between the
pan-Arctic MPA network and the high seas, the Framework currently neglects to
call for direct action in the ABNJ (see footnote 49). Particularly as warming
temperatures and sea melt drive both marine species and human activity toward
higher latitudes in the ABNJ, a clear legal instrument for MPA creation in the High
Arctic ABNJ proves increasingly critical.
5 Arctic Sanctuary: Demand for an Antarctic Model
Treaty
Following a media wave in 2008 depicting a “Wild West” type rush for the Arctic,
nongovernmental organizations and academics alike began to articulate demand for
a new treaty to govern the Arctic.49 Greenpeace, for instance, calls for designation
of an “Arctic Sanctuary” composed of 2.8 million square kilometers (out of a total
Arctic Ocean size of over 14 million square kilometers), with strict regulation of
shipping and prohibition of commercial fishing and hydrocarbon extraction.50 Like
others, Greenpeace suggested that this be done by way of a new Arctic Treaty,
rather than through existing international law such as UNCLOS. Greenpeace
further suggested that the Arctic Council’s mandate to protect the region’s envi-
ronment might allow it to pursue such a treaty even beyond its member states’
jurisdictions (see footnote 51). According to Greenpeace, the Arctic Council’s past
use of binding treaties in the case of the Agreement on Cooperation and Marine Oil
Pollution Preparedness and Response and the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement
might then serve as precedent for another treaty beyond member state EEZs
(so long as consistent with existing international law such as UNCLOS) (see
48PAME (2015), pp. 1–76.
49Holmes (2011).
50Hamilton (2014), pp. 4–15.
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footnote 51). This notion of an “Arctic Sanctuary” of course invokes the existing
Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The Antarctic Treaty was concluded in order to designate
the area as a commons for scientific use, prohibiting mineral resource extraction,
and for the peaceful use of the continent. The treaty further served to limit and
regulate tourism in the area. Moreover, influential international bodies have also
explicitly suggested that the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) might serve as a
model.51 In October 2008, the European Parliament meeting on Arctic Governance
held in Brussels articulated interest in such an international treaty:
the Commission should be prepared to pursue the opening of international negotiations
designed to lead to the adoption of an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic,
having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as supplemented by the Madrid Protocol
signed in 1991, but respecting the fundamental difference represented by the populated
nature of the Arctic and the consequent rights and needs of the peoples and nations of the
Arctic region; believes, however, that as a minimum starting-point such a treaty could at
least cover the unpopulated and unclaimed area at the center of the Arctic Ocean.52
The Southern Pole conjures a similar image to the Arctic due to extreme cold
conditions and a resulting fragile but critical ecosystem. Both regions have expe-
rienced the threat of expanding tourism and commercial activity, causing aca-
demics and the public alike to cite the Antarctic Treaty as a clear precedent for
similar action in the Arctic. However, as the European Parliament conceded, the
two regions differ in geographic nature as the Antarctic is a continental landmass
surrounded by ocean while the Arctic is instead a body of water surrounded by
landmass. Moreover, human settlements, including indigenous peoples having
special interests, already populate the Arctic. The geopolitical significance of the
Arctic is also not to be overlooked. Existing competing jurisdictional claims by
coastal states may very well undermine such a treaty on the unclaimed center of the
Arctic Ocean by the fact that more areas are under the process of being claimed,
awaiting approval by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
According to Oran Young and Paul Arthur Berkman’s piece in Science Magazine
(2009), these differences “rule out a similar treaty in the Arctic.”53
While an international treaty might still be achieved with concessions for the
notable differences between the two poles, it is worthy to consider whether such a
treaty can be a feasible solution or if such a treaty best serves the interests of
preserving the Arctic marine environment. In fact, an ATS-modeled international
treaty may not be feasible or desirable. While a binding treaty like the ATS might
possess greater normative power and pressure for compliance, the very strength of
being legally binding also serves to hamper action.54 Legally binding treaties
notably take considerable lengths of time for negotiation and enactment; a mini-
mum of four years is typical for negotiation alone (see footnote 55). The process of
51Young (2010), p. 168.
52European Parliament (2008), “Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance.”
53Berkman and Young (2009), pp. 339–340.
54Young (2010), pp. 181–184.
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ratification and negotiations might undermine the very intent of such a treaty,
watering down its environmental protections until acceptable to all signatories.
Moreover, the legal process—presumably requiring ratification of adjustments to
the treaty—might hinder any such treaty’s responsiveness to changes in scientific
knowledge or Arctic environmental conditions (see footnote 55).
Of course, whether or not such an international treaty is desirable or expedient
might not be the question of importance. Instead, is such a treaty necessary to
protect the Arctic marine environment? Under existing international law, such as
the UN Convention on Biodiversity and the UNCLOS, there already exists a
mandate for the protection of the Arctic seas. Thus, MPA creation may not require
a sweeping ATS-style treaty. Instead, clarification and extension of existing inter-
national legal frameworks may enable MPA creation.
6 Looking to the High Arctic: Legal Obligation for MPAs
in ABNJs
Establishment of an MPA within the Arctic ABNJ would find its legal basis in
UNCLOS Part XII, which establishes an obligation to protect the marine environ-
ment under Article 192. States also have a duty to protect rare and fragile ecosys-
tems and the habitat of threatened species under UNCLOS Article 194 for the
prevention of pollution of the marine environment and the duty to cooperate under
Article 107.55 According to Molenaar and Elferink (2009), MPAs can be
established in ABNJ within the framework of UNCLOS on the basis of Article
194(5).56 Article 194 (5) articulates the obligation to “protect and preserve rare or
fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered
species and other forms of marine life.” The other articles of UNCLOS also lend
support to the creation of MPAs in ABNJ for the purpose of, for example, conser-
vation and management of living resources in Article 61.57 Finally, Article
145 establishes obligation for “the protection and conservation of the natural
resources of the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the
marine environment” (see footnote 19). The Area is defined by the Convention as
the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. The marine environment in the water column above the “Area”
therefore also would fall beyond boundaries of national jurisdiction.58 Though
there apparently exists a legal basis for the creation of an MPA in an ABNJ, there
presently exists no accepted comprehensive legal framework for execution of such
an obligation.
55United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 76.
56Molenaar and Oude Elferink (2009), pp. 5, 9.
57United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 61.
58United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 1.
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In lieu of an existing legal framework to fulfill the obligation to protect the High
Arctic marine environment, we suggest three other potential approaches for MPA
creation in an ABNJ: an UNCLOS implementing agreement or a protocol under
UNCBD or a regional agreement to be concluded among the Arctic states. The
aforementioned strategies are drawn from the recommendations from experts at the
international seminar “Towards a legal framework for the creation and management
of cross-sectoral marine protected areas in areas beyond national jurisdiction” in
Boulogne-sur-Mer, France, in 2011.59 The Boulogne-sur-Mer international seminar
was organized by IUCN and Institute for Sustainable Development and Interna-
tional Relations (IDDRI) in partnership with the Agency for Marine Protected
Areas, University of the Littoral – Opal Coast, the European Office for Conserva-
tion and Development, and the Nausicaa´ (National Sea Centre – Boulogne-sur-Mer)
in an effort to identify avenues for the creation of MPAs in ABNJs. Twenty
international experts collaborated in applying precedents of international law to
create viable scenarios for the creation and management of MPAs in high seas by
2030—the decade in which an ice-free Arctic summer is predicted. Findings from
the seminar were to inform the United Nations at the Rio+20 Conference and the
IUCN World Congress in 2012.60
6.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) Implementing Agreement
The UNCLOS, while providing legal mandate for conservation measures in ABNJs
such as MPAs, lacks an implementing agreement to provide a legal framework for
MPA creation in an area beyond national jurisdiction. Part XII of the Convention
provides that states’ sovereign rights in the marine area coexist with the duty to
protect and preserve the marine environment (Article 193).61 UNCLOS establishes
the general obligations of all states to safeguard the marine environment in its
entirety while offering a structure for dealing with all sources of pollution at sea.
The Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 expressed par-
ticular interest in reforming the institutional framework for ocean governance, with
particular attention to an amendment to UNCLOS that would address gaps in the
current framework for conservation in ABNJs.62 The Rio+20 proposal referenced
“possible development of a multilateral agreement” under UNCLOS specifically
(see footnote 63). The proposal also necessitated the designation of a lead UN
agency to manage MPA designation. With growing demand for an UNCLOS
implementing agreement from within the United Nations, it appears that internal
59Druel et al. (2011), pp. 1–28.
60IOC/UNESCO, IMO, FAO, UNDP (2011), pp. 39–40.
61United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
62IOC/UNESCO, IMO, FAO, UNDP (2011), pp. 39–40.
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pressure and public opinion exist. As a result, at the UN level the General Assembly
established a Preparatory Committee to produce a draft text for an internationally
binding legal instrument on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biolog-
ical diversity in the ABNJ under UNCLOS.63 However, negotiating a treaty as such
is a far-reaching process since the Committee has just had its first meeting from
March 28 to April 8, 2016, with a timeline to report to the General Assembly on the
draft by the end of 2017, at which point the Assembly will take effort to convene an
international conference to negotiate the agreement. Even if the agreement were
eventually materialized, the general scope of the potential agreement would not be
capable of dealing with Arctic-specific critical conditions unless an Arctic chapter
in it is agreed upon.64 Consequently, despite the Preparatory Committee’s endeavor
to address area-based management tools (ABMTs), including MPAs,65 a universal
nature of the scope of the agreement would probably fall short of addressing critical
specificities prevailing in the Arctic. Nevertheless, the creation of an implementing
agreement through UNCLOS offers clearly a legitimate avenue for the creation and
management of MPAs in ABNJs, enforceable for all signatories. Compared to
regionally authorized MPAs, an UNCLOS implementing instrument would make
all UNCLOS state parties to the agreement, following ratification on behalf of each
signatory. By explicitly forging an implementation agreement for governance of the
high seas under UNCLOS, all the state parties to UNCLOS would also be mandated
to recognize an MPA in the Arctic high seas. While perhaps less expedient than a
regional agreement, such expansion and clarification of the UNCLOS would
mandate greater participation. Notably, this arrangement would also provide a
legitimate avenue for enforcement under the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea.66 However, an UNCLOS implementing agreement would require a
complicated process of renewed ratification—possibly with less clarity as concerns
Arctic-specific conditions. Thus, like Antarctic-modeled treaty making, this legal
pathway presents similar complexity in the effective realization of such an
implementing agreement, even under the UNCLOS.
63UN GA Res. 69/292 of 19 June 2015.
64Hossain (2016).
65See Chair’s overview of the first session of the Preparatory Committee, Preparatory Committee
established by General Assembly resolution 69/292: Development of an international legally
binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
66Druel et al. (2011), p. 16.
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6.2 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
(UNCBD) Additional Protocol
Though present international legal discourse gives prominence to the UNCBD, a
mandate for the protection of the global marine environment might allow for a legal
framework by way of an additional protocol. Article 5 establishes the obligation of
contracting parties to cooperate with other contracting parties either directly or
through international organizations in the interest of conserving biodiversity in
areas beyond national jurisdiction.67 In the UNCBD’s preamble, the Convention
instructs its parties to use the precautionary approach in environmental conserva-
tion. The Conference of the Parties (COP) Decision II/10 reiterates the direction to
use the precautionary approach in regard to marine environments.68 Given that all
the Arctic states, excluding the United States, are party to the UNCBD, they are all
subject to the mandate to use precautionary approach in marine governance.
The UNCBD possesses particular validity as a means for a legal framework for
MPA creation due to the CBD’s precedent of offering scientific insight on the
designation of Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs), criteria also
used to create MPAs.69 The UNCBD already possesses significant expertise in the
area, evidenced by the existing Working Group on Protected Areas. The Working
Group’s mandate explicitly calls for an effort to identify methods for MPA creation
in areas beyond national jurisdiction that are consistent with existing international
law.70
The UNCBD has already created two additional protocols that serve as supple-
mentary agreements to the original convention: the Cartagena Protocol and the
Nagoya Protocol.71 The Nagoya Protocol in particular was agreed upon in order to
create a clear legal framework for the satisfaction of the CBD objective of fair and
equitable sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources (see footnote 71).
With these two protocols serving as precedent, a similar protocol might be enacted
to create a transparent and formalized legal framework for the creation of MPAs
even in areas beyond national jurisdiction, as the mandate for such action is
provided in the UNCBD. And yet again, this type of framework requires a similarly
lengthy process as is required for an implementing agreement under UNCLOS,
making its realization both time consuming and complicated.
67UNCBD (1992).
68Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jakarta, Indonesia, Nov.
6–17, 1995. Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity,
Decision II/10, Part XI, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/II/10.
69The EBSA criteria has been used in the past to aid in conservation targets by the Sargasso Sea
Alliance (SSA) and OSPAR. See Freestone et al. (2014).
70Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Protected Areas (2004).
71The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2003).
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6.3 A Regional Arrangement
Marine protected areas in ABNJs already have been established in other areas of the
globe under the auspices of regional arrangements. Such regional arrangements
have been used to establish MPAs in high seas of the Northern Ocean, the Northeast
Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the South Pacific, though no such arrangement has
been used comprehensively in the Arctic.72 The Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (“OSPAR Convention”) of
1992 established the OSPAR Commission in order to foresee the conservation
and protection of the North-East Atlantic marine area. The OSPAR Convention’s
preamble cites UNCLOS Article 197 as providing a mandate for global and
regional cooperation of the marine environment.73 It is suggested that cooperation
between OSPAR Convention, the regulatory body and legal instrument tasked with
preserving environment and resources of the North-East Atlantic, and sectoral
regulatory organizations, such as Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
(RFMOs), offers a comprehensive model for cooperation to create a similar
regional agreement.74 Though limited in its Arctic claims, OSPAR’s work in Arctic
ABNJs shows that successful precedent exists for a coalition of regional actors to
approach MPA creation in the high seas.75 Similar models for MPA creation in
ABNJ under the auspices of regional arrangements include the nonbinding Hamil-
ton Declaration on Collaboration for the Conservation of the Sargasso Sea and
under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal
Region of the Mediterranean (the ammended Barcelona Convention).76
Though no regional sea management organization exists within the Arctic, the
Arctic Council might serve as a venue for the creation of similar regional organi-
zation to facilitate MPA creation within an ABNJ. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration
established the Arctic Council of the eight Arctic states—Sweden, the Russian
Federation, the United States of America, Finland, Norway, Canada, Iceland, and
Denmark—to ensure circumpolar cooperation with particular focus on environ-
mental protection and sustainable development.77 Greenpeace suggests that the
Arctic Council’s mandate to protect the Arctic environment might give it grounds
for greater action, extending even beyond its respective countries’ borders.78 The
72Rochette et al. (2014), pp. 109–117.
73OSPAR Convention For The Protection Of The Marine Environment Of The North-East Atlantic
(1992), 1–33.
74Druel et al. (2011), pp. 10–11.
75OSPAR in particular has pioneered efforts for MPA creation in ABNJs, in the North-East
Atlantic Ocean. See Molenaar and Oude Elferink (2009), pp. 5, 9.
76The EBSA criteria has been used in the past to aid in conservation targets by the Sargasso Sea
Alliance (SSA) and OSPAR. See Freestone et al. (2014).
77Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council” (Ottawa, Canada,
1996).
78Hamilton (2014), pp. 4–15.
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Arctic Council has taken initiative to negotiate even binding regional agreements in
areas beyond national jurisdiction through past efforts such as the Agreement on
Cooperation and Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response and the Arctic
Search and Rescue Agreement.79 The precedent of binding treaties in waters
beyond members’ EEZs could serve as grounds for a regional treaty creating
MPAs even beyond EEZs, though only binding for the eight Arctic states and
other parties that choose to accede to the treaty through future signature and
ratification.
Such a regional legal arrangement may prove to be more politically expedient
compared to a UNCBD additional protocol or an UNCLOS implementing agree-
ment. Common needs in the Arctic have resulted in notable past regional cooper-
ation and governance arrangements. The Arctic Council possesses a mandate to
protect the Arctic environment by way of the Ottawa Declaration, reaffirmed by the
Arctic coastal states in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration. Greenpeace suggests that the
Arctic Council’s mandate to protect the Arctic environment might give it grounds
for greater action, extending even beyond its respective countries’ borders. Past
Arctic Council initiatives resulted in a number of binding and nonbinding agree-
ments relating to the marine environment, creating precedent for regional
approaches to Arctic Ocean governance. A binding agreement, to be concluded
within the auspices of the Arctic Council, among the Arctic Eight might be used to
coordinate MPA creation in the Arctic ABNJ. Further, PAME’s existing work to
create a pan-Arctic MPA network among the Arctic EEZs provides a reasonable
foundation for an extension of the network into the high seas.
A regional-agreement-based MPA does not legally bind a nonstate party, thus
remaining compliant with international law and UNCLOS. Further, coordination
with international bodies such as the IMO is considered necessary to ensure that
creation of an MPA in the high seas does not violate existing international maritime
law.80 Compliance with UNCLOS does limit the ability of such a regional agree-
ment to enforce high sea MPA observance among nonmembers. However, such
regional agreement can establish powerful normative guidance and also achieve
nonparty compliance through mutual observer status, which would establish reci-
procity for the mutual acknowledgement of participating parties’ protected areas.
For instance, the OSPAR Convention cannot enforce MPAs for international actors
not party to the Convention (abiding by UNCLOS), but the Convention has
mechanisms to engage nonparty states operating in OSPAR waters. The
17 contracting parties can invite nonparty states to accede to the Convention,
often through arrangements of mutual observer status or memorandums of under-
standing (MoUs), thus making the MPA in ABNJ more enforceable while acknowl-
edging freedom of the high seas. Thus, an Arctic-style regional agreement modeled
after OSPAR could provide a robust marine environmental governance regime.
79Arctic Council: Agreements. (2015, September 16).
80OSPAR in particular has noted the need for cooperation with international bodies such as the
IMO. See OSPAR Commission (2012), p. 19.
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Thus, lacking a new legal framework under the UNCLOS and UNCBD, a regional
agreement is arguably the most suitable tool in its enforcement capacity and ability
to set a norm for nonparties to comply.
7 Conclusion: A Regional Arrangement in Wait
of a Formal Legal Framework
A regional agreement will only enforce recognition of a High Arctic MPA among
ratifying signatory member states, with limited capacity for enforcement. By
comparison, a legal framework through an implementing agreement under
UNCLOS would allow for wider reach, extending to all ratifying state parties.
Further, such an arrangement would allow for an enforcement mechanism by way
of the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea. The potential for an additional
protocol to the UNCBD also should not be ignored, given past precedent, interna-
tional scope, and existing expertise in the creation of protected areas. Both instru-
ments would lend international scope and recognition for a High Arctic MPA while
addressing a critical gap in existing global marine governance. Though increasing
public pressure exists for such a framework, the near horizon for an ice-free Arctic
obliges immediate and effective action. The complicated lengthy process in
reaching a large-scale consensus, either for UNCLOS implementing agreement or
for UNCBD Protocol, is challenging. In lieu of such an international agreement, a
regional agreement offers to begin MPA designation in the Arctic high seas under
existing legal mandates, and among only the eight Arctic states. Drawing upon the
expertise and collaboration of the pan-Arctic MPA network within members’ EEZs,
the Arctic states under the auspices of the Arctic Council possess proficiency to
begin MPA designation in the Arctic ABNJ. Increased use of such regional
agreements to protect the global commons might provide the impetus for broader
protection under the UNCLOS or UNCBD.
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